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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4783
In 1993, in response to persistent unemployment, and 
rising poverty and social unrest, the government of 
Albania introduced an anti-poverty program, namely 
Ndihma Ekonomike; in 1995 it was extended to all poor 
households. This paper estimates the separate effects of 
participation in this income support program and the 
old-age pension program on objective and subjective 
measures of household poverty. The analysis uses the 
nationally representative Albanian Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys carried out in 2002 and 2005. 
Using propensity score matching methods, the paper 
finds that Ndihma Ekonomike households, particularly 
urban residents, have lower per capita consumption 
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and are more likely to be discontented with their lives, 
financial situation, and consumption levels than their 
matched comparators. In contrast, households receiving 
pensions are not significantly different from their 
matched comparators in reference to the same set of 
outcomes. The paper finds that the negative impact of 
Ndihma Ekonomike participation on welfare is driven 
by a negative labor supply response among work-eligible 
individuals. This negative labor response is larger among 
women and urban residents. In contrast to Ndihma 
Ekonomike, the receipt of old-age pension income 
transfers does not significantly impact the labor supply of 
prime-age individuals living in pension households 
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  Between 1945 and 1990, the communist economy of Albania was characterized by an 
absolute dependence on central planning, the elimination of private property, and the pursuit of 
national self-reliance. Since the country followed a policy of complete social and economic 
isolation, the international movement of its citizens was also prohibited. This self-seclusion was 
exacerbated during the 1970s, as foreign aid and investment were constitutionally outlawed in 
1976. Consequently, the average annual GDP growth was 1 percent throughout the 1980s, 
compared to 5 percent in the previous decade. By 1990, the economic decline was so severe that 
over-reliance on central planning was abandoned. With the collapse of communism, industrial 
closures led to massive unemployment, and the subsequent contraction of the state revenues 
limited the government’s ability to provide adequate unemployment benefits for the laid-off 
workers. In addition, the removal of price controls triggered a significant decline in the real 
incomes of Albanian households.  
  In response to persistent unemployment, and rising poverty and social unrest, the 
government introduced an anti-poverty program, namely Ndihma Ekonomike (NE), in 1993. 
Although originally designed to support urban families without income, and rural households 
with small landholdings, the program was extended to all poor households in 1995. Even though 
the objective of the NE and many other Albanian social transfer initiatives instituted or expanded 
during the 1990s is to lift poor households out of poverty, their performance has never been 
assessed. Despite Albania’s impressive growth performance recently, survey data shows that the 
poverty rate remained at 18.5 percent in 2005 (World Bank and INSTAT, 2006). As the country 
strives to match its post-transition growth performance with significant reductions in poverty, 
                                                 
1The information presented in this section on Albania’s pre-transition background is obtained from Haderi, 
Papapanagos, Sanfey & Talka (1999).  
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evaluating its social protection programs should be central to successful anti-poverty policy-
making.  
  This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first systematic impact evaluation of the 
NE and the old-age pension programs, which constitute the core of the Albanian social 
protection system. It uses the two recent (2002 and 2005) nationally representative Albanian 
Living Standards Measurement Surveys (ALSMS02 and ALSMS05, respectively) to estimate the 
separate effects of participation in these programs on household’s objective and subjective 
poverty measures. In the absence of panel consumption data, the empirical methodology of 
choice is propensity score matching. With respect to their matched comparators, the NE 
households have on average a lower per capita consumption, and exhibit a higher degree of 
discontent with life, financial situation, and consumption levels. These differences are mainly 
driven by the urban areas. Rural differences, while still significant, are much less alarming in 
terms of magnitude. Conversely, the average differences in all welfare outcomes of interest 
across pension treatment and comparison groups are not statistically significant. 
  In order to provide a potential explanation of the program impacts on household welfare 
outcomes, we investigate the possibility of a negative labor supply response among work-eligible 
individuals to household NE and/or old-age pension receipts. Indeed, a well-documented 
unintended consequence of income transfers is the negative labor supply response to program 
participation (Murray, 1984; Harrington, 1984; Darity Jr. & Myers Jr., 1987). Sometimes, the 
disincentive effects of the transfer programs may be so significant that they outweigh the 
redistributive gains. In the extreme, the negative labor supply effect may lead to less of a 
reduction in poverty and high inequality, contrary to a program’s objectives.  
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  Most of the evidence on the negative labor supply response to transfer programs comes 
from evaluations of programs managed by industrialized countries (see reviews by Hausman, 
1985; Blundell & Macurdy, 1999; Moffitt, 2002). Far less is known about these responses in the 
context of developing or transition economies many of which like developed countries, manage 
multiple cash transfers programs as part of their anti-poverty strategy. However, because they 
often also experience high levels of unemployment, the distortionary effect of transfers on labor 
supply may be minimal. Establishing the validity of this claim is important, since it can influence 
the direction of welfare reform. A negligible labor supply response puts the focus of reforms on 
the efficient delivery of benefits, whereas a substantial negative labor supply response renders 
the alleviation of work disincentive effects paramount in search of the best way to structure the 
program and lift the needy out of poverty. 
  Moreover, an important debate in the literature is whether the negative labor supply 
response is through a reduction in hours or weeks worked (at the intensive margin) or the 
likelihood of labor force participation (at the extensive margin) (Heckman, 1993). The emerging 
consensus in the literature on the U.S. suggests that much of the labor supply response to income 
support programs, especially for low income earners, takes place on the extensive margin (Eissa 
& Liebman, 1996; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001; Eissa & Hoynes, 2004; Eissa, Kleven, & 
Kreiner, 2004). This is important for the design of the optimal transfer policy which as shown by 
Saez (2002) depends on the margin on which the behavioral responses are concentrated. 
  Furthermore, for developed economies, participation decisions often boil down to 
whether or not to take up wage employment. In developing and transition economies, however, 
individuals have a number of options, including wage employment for a non-household member, 
working on a household farm or working on own account. Therefore, exploring the labor supply  
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response to an income support program across these employment schemes is interesting in and of 
itself, especially in light of the optimal transfer policy discussed in the recent empirical literature. 
  An additional contribution of our paper is to look at whether the labor supply response 
will differ across transfer programs. Many analysts look at the labor supply response of one 
program in isolation. From the developing countries, one such program that has received 
significant attention is the South African old-age social pension (see Case & Deaton, 1998; 
Bertrand, Mullainathan & Miller, 2003; Ardington, Case & Hosegood, 2007). There are, 
however, reasons why looking at more programs is important. It may tell us whether households 
treat transfer programs differently. Income from one transfer program may be treated as certain 
income, while another may be treated as “temporary”, which has different implications for 
household behavior. In developing countries, knowing which of the many transfer programs 
induce larger negative labor supply responses can also inform prioritization and sequencing of 
reforms of the transfer programs.    
  Hence, the paper goes on to explore the impact of household receipts from NE and old-
age pension on labor supply of work-eligible individuals at the extensive and intensive margins,
2 
using the Albanian Panel Survey (APS). The panel regression models used also control for 
household receipts from work invalidity pension, and “other”
3  transfer programs. However, the 
coefficients on these variables are not reported, considering our focus on the NE program and the 
old-age pensions. Given distinct gendered and urban/rural differences in labor market outcomes, 
                                                 
2Traditionally, the empirical studies analyzing labor supply response on the intensive margin have used cross 
sectional data, and defined the outcome of interest as hours or weeks worked conditional on labor force 
participation. In the case of panel data, if regressions of hours or weeks of labor supply are conditioned on labor 
force participation, this is likely to lead to an unbalanced panel and loss of information, since labor force 
participation status of individuals does not necessarily stay constant over time. Given this complexity, this study 
refers to labor supply at the intensive margin simply as hours or weeks worked, without conditioning the outcome on 
labor force participation. 
3We define household work invalidity pension receipts to include disability, unemployment, illness and maternity 
benefits received by household members. Household receipts from “other” social protection programs is the sum 
household member receipts from survivor, special merit, war veteran, social care/services pensions.  
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as outlined in Section 3, the paper estimates the heterogeneity of program impact by urban/rural 
residence and by gender. 
  The results show that the labor supply response to household NE receipts is large and 
negative, whether labor supply is measured in terms of labor force participation, hours or weeks 
worked. Moreover, the negative labor supply response is larger among women, and is principally 
driven by urban individuals. Unlike the South African case, household pension receipts in 
Albania do not exert any impact on individual labor supply, regardless of gender or urban/rural 
residence.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the descriptions of the social 
protection programs of interest. Section 3 presents the recent Albanian labor market dynamics. 
Section 4 describes the data, while section 5 explains our empirical approach. Sections 6 and 7 
report the regression results, and the concluding remarks, respectively. 
 
2. Albanian Social Protection Programs 
  The Albanian social protection system is composed of multiple programs which attempt 
to provide extensive coverage against the risks of poverty, old-age, disability, unemployment, 
short term illness, and maternity. With the exception of social assistance transfers provided by 
the NE program, all social protection benefits are financed through payroll contributions of both 
employers and employees. However, the post-transition surge in the degree of labor market 
informality has led to inadequate revenue generation via payroll contributions, while the 
existence of several generations of elderly, most of whom have full pension rights, has limited 
the government’s ability to provide comprehensive social protection. The country avoided a 
fiscal crisis in the social protection system mainly by compressing benefit levels. This has in turn 
promoted individuals to declare lower earnings and spend more of their careers in the informal  
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sector, as benefits are likely to be low regardless of the level of contributions. Below, we provide 




  Albania is divided into 12 administrative regions (prefectures), 36 districts and 374 
municipalities (65) and communes (309). As currently administered, the NE program requires 
the elected councils of communes to submit their requests for social assistance funds to the 
Regional State Social Service Office Administration based on their own assessments of their 
households’ needs. These requests are considered by the State Social Service Administration 
(SSS), which assesses and submits each commune’s request for financial assistance to the 
Directorate for Programming and Development (DPD) in the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs (MLSA). The DPD then decides on the final allocation to each commune, in accordance 
with the national budget adopted by the parliament.
5  
Subsequent to the decision of the DPD and the distribution of NE funds to municipalities 
and communes, the intra-commune allocation process has three steps. First, the head of the 
household applies for social assistance at the local NE office and undergoes an interview with a 
social administrator. Filing of applications for social assistance occurs monthly whereas the 
interview by the social administrator is renewed annually. Monthly application requires the head 
of the household to re-state the income sources of the household as well as any updates regarding 
the employment status of household members or household property ownership. This 
                                                 
4The details of the NE program presented in this section are obtained from Albanian Council of Ministers (2005). 
5The DPD’s determination process of communes’ final NE allocations is not as transparent as it should be. None of 
the official MLSA documents clearly defines the specifics of the inter-commune allocation process. However, it is 
known that the commune councils provide the Ministry information on a range of socio-economic variables at the 




information has to be verified every month via the collaboration between the local NE office and 
other public offices.  
  Necessary documentation for the first-time application consists of (i) a statement of the 
socio-economic status of the household
6; (ii) a family status certificate, which includes 
information on the date of registration of the present dwelling, previous dwelling location, and 
any other family changes/additions; (iii) a certificate of verification of ownership issued by the 
Immovable Properties Registration Office; (iv) land titles for areas where land registration is not 
finalized; and (v) certificates issued by the labor office every three months for working-age 
household members who are unemployed job seekers.  
  The documents required from other public offices are gathered directly by the local 
program office. Following the collection of the required documentation and information cross-
check, the social administrator verifies the socio-economic status of applicants by paying annual 
home visits and assessing dwelling conditions.
  She crafts a list of eligible recipients and 
estimates each household’s need according to its size, earnings potential, and landholdings. This 
detailed information collection and verification process stems from the local administrators’ 
superior information on the socio-economic status of applicant households which also led to the 
decentralization of the program’s implementation. 
  The Albanian government considers households with no or insufficient income as eligible 
for social assistance. Participation in NE also requires the head of household to be unemployed. 
On the other hand, households are ineligible for social assistance if at least one member (i) owns 
stakes/shares of any kind other than the dwelling and agricultural land; (ii) is abroad for any 
reason other than education, medical treatment, diplomatic work, or assignment at an 
                                                 
6This statement is submitted by the head of the household at the time of the application and renewed annually. It 
provides information on all household income sources, household composition and assets, dwelling conditions, as 
well as employment, health and education status all of household members.  
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international organization, (iii) is unemployed but not registered as a jobseeker, with the 
exception of agricultural households, and disabled individuals, (iv) refuses to take up 
employment offers by the employment office and/or does not participate in community works 
organized by the municipality or in vocational training courses when unemployed, able and of 
working age; (v) does not withdraw the social assistance amount within 6 working days of funds 
becoming available at the bank; or (vi) takes purposeful actions to receive unmerited social 
assistance.  
  The benefit guidelines are established by the central government and cannot be altered by 
local authorities. The potential monthly compensation currently consists of (i) 2600 Lek for the 
head of the household and each household member above the age of 18, (ii) 600 Lek for each 
household member that is 18 years old, and (iii) 700 Lek for each household member under 18. 
The monthly social assistance cannot exceed 7000 Lek, regardless of the household’s size and 
composition. 
The eligible household’s actual monthly social assistance allocation depends on its 
earnings which include household receipts from (i) non-farm economic activities, (ii) different 
schemes of social protection, and (iii) any type of capital, land production, and livestock. The 
household’s actual level of social assistance is computed by subtracting its actual earnings from 
the potential monthly social assistance. This implies a benefit reduction rate of 100 percent. 
Households with a calculated social assistance amount of 800 Lek or less become ineligible. 
Considering that the absolute poverty line utilized to identify the poor households in this study is 
4981 Lek per capita, even the maximum NE program benefit may not always be adequate 
enough to provide the basic needs of program beneficiaries, in the absence of other income  
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sources. In 2002, the average NE benefit was 2389 Lek, roughly 50 percent of the poverty line, 
and 25 percent of the monthly minimum wage.
7 
  Finally, the social administrator submits the list of eligible families along with the 
calculated social assistance allocations to the elected commune council.
 The latter subsquently 
determines the final actual allocation for each household. The council has the authority to (i) 
condition social assistance on participation in community projects, and (ii) revise the list and 
payment per household, according to the availability of funds from the center. The social 
assistance receipts may thus change throughout the year, based on (i) semi-annual evaluations by 
the social administrator and (ii) bi-monthly fund allocations from the center to the commune.  
  As Table 1 indicates, in 2005, the total expenditure on the NE program was 3.3 billion 
Lek (1$ = 103.3 Lek, 12/2005 Average) or 6.0 (0.4) percent of total government expenditure on 
social protection (GDP) (World Bank, 2006c). Over the period of 1993-2004, the program 
budget decreased from 1.4 to 0.47 percent of GDP, and from 3.4 to 1.9 percent of government 




In addition to the NE program, the estimation of the impact of household old-age pension 
receipts on household consumption and work-eligible individual labor supply is at the heart of 
this analysis. According to Table 1, the government allocated the greatest share (68.0 percent) of 
social protection expenditure in 2005 to old-age pensions by spending 40.2 billion Lek. The 
eligibility for old-age pensions is based on the number of years of contributions and the 
retirement age, which was 60/55 for men and women, respectively, in 2001. Since 2002, it has 
                                                 
7 The monthly minimum wage was 9400, 10080, 11800 Lek in 2002, 2004, and 2005, respectively. (World Bank, 
2006b) 
8The background information on old-age pensions is obtained from World Bank (2006a).  
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been rising by 6 months per annum in order to reach the 65/60 mark by 2012. While 35 years of 
service is required to be a pension recipient, prorated pensions are available after 15 years of 
service.  
  The monthly old-age pension is composed of a base pension, the minimum pension, and 
an increment that reflects the length of contribution history. Due to differences in standards of 
living, rural pensioners have a lower base pension than their urban counterparts. The pension 
contribution rate was 29.9 percent of which 71.2 percent are covered by the employer. The high 
contribution rate is believed to drive the steady decline in labor force formalization and the rate 
of participation in old-age pensions among private businesses since transition.  
  Furthermore, the taxable salary cannot be more than five times the minimum wage, while 
the maximum amount of pension received by an individual cannot exceed twice the minimum 
pension. These restrictions encourage individuals to underreport earnings/time worked and to 
work for fewer years since working substantially longer will not bring them higher benefits. 
Hence, while the private sector is supposed to pay better salaries than the public sector, more 
than 50 percent of private sector workers are declaring minimum wages as only 1 percent of 
public sector employees are declaring minimum wage. Lastly, although approximately 372,000 
people are estimated to be above the retirement age, more than 440,000 are currently pension 
recipients. The discrepancy is in part due to the failure of families to inform the Social Insurance 
Institute (SII) that the pensioner has died and that the pension should be terminated. 
 
3. Albanian Labor Market Dynamics
9 
  Since the collapse of the pyramid investment schemes in 1997, Albania’s GDP has grown 
on average roughly 8 percent each year. Yet, as a result of improved allocation of production 
                                                 
9The findings presented in this section are obtained from World Bank (2006b), unless otherwise stated.    
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factors, the economy has actually managed to grow without significant employment expansion. 
Resources have been reallocated from low-productivity sectors like agriculture to relatively 
higher-productivity sectors, such as services and construction. For the 1993-2003 period the 
contribution of total factor productivity growth to the average annual real GDP growth of 6.3 
percent was 6.1 percentage points.
10 Considering the almost nonexistent contribution of 
employment growth to the overall post-transition output expansion, it is important to understand 
the labor market dynamics in Albania, which will also help in forming expectations regarding the 
impact of social protection receipts on labor, and poverty outcomes.  
  Public sector employment decreased from 850,000 in 1991 to 169,000 in 2006. A 
significant part of this reduction originated from the privatization of state-owned enterprises in 
early transition. According to annual employment figures presented in Table 2, the public sector 
accounts for 18 percent of total employment in 2006 versus 58 percent for the agricultural sector. 
Although employment is partly shifting to the private, non-agricultural sector, job creation has 
been stagnant, with only 23,000 new jobs created between 2001 and 2004. The most common 
transition from unemployment to work is into self-employment in agriculture or the informal 
sector. Very few of the previously unemployed manage to find formal wage employment. 
  According to the LSMS estimates in Table 3, the national labor force participation rate 
was between 64-69 percent in 2004, depending on the definition used.
11 The 2004 national 
                                                 
10In terms of overall ease of doing business, World Bank’s Doing Business 2006 ranking places Albania at 117 
among the 155 countries (World Bank, 2006b). Albania performs poorly (i.e. is in the bottom third) in the following 
areas: starting a business, dealing with licenses, hiring and firing, protecting investors, paying taxes, and enforcing 
contracts (World Bank, 2006b). These findings partially explain the lack of substantial job creation in the 
nonagricultural private sector. 
11Under the standard definition, adults who are not employed must engage in active job search to be classified as in 
the labor force and unemployed. Willingness to take a job without active job search is considered inadequate. Under 
the relaxed definition of labor force participation and unemployment, individuals without jobs are included in the 
labor force and considered unemployed if they have either searched for work in the last four weeks or have not 
searched but would be willing to take a job in the next two weeks. In other words, including estimates based on the  
 
12
employment rate was only 60 percent. There are also major differences in rural and urban labor 
market outcomes, as shown in Table 3. Participation in the labor force is substantially more 
likely in rural than urban areas. This is mainly driven by employment in subsistence family 
farming in rural areas, where family labor (often unpaid) is the primary factor of production. 
Since the rural rate of poverty stood at 24.5 percent in 2005 (compared to 11.2 percent in urban 
areas), inactivity and unemployment are typically not in the choice set of rural individuals 
(World Bank & INSTAT, 2006). This is not the case in the urban economy where insufficient 
labor demand breeds inactivity and unemployment among the working-age population.  
  Moreover, Table 4 demonstrates distinct differences in employment outcomes across men 
and women. The LSMS data indicate that the unemployment rate is considerably higher for 
women. In 2004, the women’s unemployment (employment) rate was 5 (22) percentage points 
higher (lower) than the rate for men. Among the unemployed, women are also more likely to be 
discouraged than men, as measured by the differential between the standard and relaxed 
unemployment rates. While the 2004 difference was about 10 percentage points for women, it 
was 6 points for men. Breaking down rural/urban labor market statistics by gender in Table 4 
also enables to determine the factors driving the overall differences in labor market outcomes. 
Aggregate indicators are significantly better for both men and women in rural areas where 
gender disparities are also narrower. 
  As transfer recipients adjust their labor supply conditional on labor market dynamics and 
the availability of social transfers and other non-labor sources of income, gendered and spatial 
differences in labor market outcomes may imply unique incentive effects of social protection 
programs for men/women, and across urban/rural areas. In particular, one expects work 
                                                                                                                                                             
relaxed definition recognizes the validity of the discouraged worker effect in Albania, and yields an unemployment 
rate of 13.4 percent in 2004.  
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disincentive effects of income transfers to differ in labor markets with different levels of risk and 
segmentation into high vs. low wage, and modern vs. agricultural, sectors. In urban Albania, 
unemployment risk is high and a small high-wage (formal) sector coexists with a large low-wage 
(informal) sector, where job tenure is shorter and the wage distribution is more unequal. Hence, 
urban transfer recipients, who are likely to initially enter the labor market with a low-paying job, 
may lower their labor supply in response to an unconditional income transfer.  
  On the other hand, in rural Albania, where (i) the rate of unemployment (labor force 
participation) has been traditionally lower (higher), (ii) the main activity, i.e. farming, is risky, 
and (iii) insurance/credit markets are either missing or incomplete, transfer income may serve as 
insurance, and the negative labor supply response may be absent. Additionally, since women 
record significantly lower labor force participation rates, and exhibit higher levels of 
unemployment and discouragement, the disincentive effects of income support, if any, may be 
stronger among females. Lastly, if social transfers prove inadequate to lift poor households out of 
poverty, and welfare recipients lack other forms of social insurance and access to credit to 
smooth consumption over time, negative labor response to program participation may translate 
into reductions in household welfare. These possibilities will be carefully considered as the links 
between transfer programs and household welfare and labor market outcomes are explored. 
 
4. Data 
  The data used for the cross sectional, household-level analysis come from ALSMS02 and 
ALSMS05. The surveys are nationally representative and their sampling frames are stratified 
into four regions – namely coastal, central, mountain and Tirana (the capital city). ALSMS02 
and ALSMS05 collected information on 3,599 and 3,640 households, respectively. A typical 
household questionnaire with general household demographics, education levels, asset  
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ownership, expenditures, labor force participation and social protection dynamics was 
administered in both years, in addition to a community questionnaire that included information 
on access to services and infrastructure in the locality, and price information. All variables used 
in our analysis were constructed from answers to identical questions in ALSMS02 and 
ALSMS05. 
  The data used for the panel, individual-level analysis are drawn from the APS. The 
nationally representative APS is a subsample of the 3,599 households interviewed for 
ALSMS02. More specifically, as part of the APS, 7,973 members of 1,782 ALSMS02 
households were tracked and re-interviewed in 2003 and 2004. New members that joined the 
original 1,782 ALSMS02 households also participated in the panel survey, as well as the 
members of new households which were formed by original ALSMS02 individuals. Starting in 
2003, only individuals aged 15 years and over were eligible for interview. Sample members that 
were abroad at the time of a particular wave of the APS were not tracked, but they remained 
eligible for interview at a future wave if they returned to their households in Albania. As a result, 
the panel survey collected information on 8,542 individuals living in more than 1,800 households 
from 2002 to 2004.    
  For the purposes of panel analysis, our sample is restricted to work-eligible individuals (i) 
for whom information is available for all three years, (ii) who have not been full-time students at 
any point between 2002 and 2004, and (iii) who were between the ages 15 and 55 in 2002. As 
the retirement age in Albania is 57 and 62 for women and men respectively, the age cut-off 
allows the sample individuals to be of working age throughout the period of analysis. Our results 
are robust to marginal changes in the ceiling age. Most importantly, heads of household have 
also been excluded because eligibility to NE is tied to their employment status. Including heads  
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of household could thus introduce a downward bias to our labor supply estimates. The final 
sample is a balanced panel of 2,329 individuals of whom 1,734 (74.4 percent) are women. The 
sample is heavily skewed towards women because households are overwhelmingly headed by 
males. 
  In Table 5 (6), we provide sample means from ALSMS02 and the results from the 
weighted tests of mean differences by household NE (old-age pension) recipient status. The tests 
of mean differences in individual characteristics were run among work eligible individuals, 
whereas the tests of mean differences in household-level variables were computed among 
households. 2005, as opposed to 2002, descriptive comparisons do not yield different results with 
respect to the findings reported here. The majority of the mean differences reported in Table 5 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. We observe that work eligible individuals from NE 
households, on average, work less (in terms of hours or weeks of labor supplied), and are less 
likely to have worked in the past 7 days in comparison to their counterparts from non-NE 
households. In contrast, Table 6 shows that work eligible individuals from pension households 
are more likely to have worked the last seven days and work longer hours and more weeks with 
respect to comparable members of non-pension households, these differences are however small 
in magnitude. Although work-eligible individuals from NE households are less educated than 
their comparators from non-NE households, the comparison of years of education by household 
old-age pension recipient status yields the opposite result. 
  Furthermore, while NE households record, on average, lower per capita consumption 
than non-NE households, the test of mean differences in the same variable by household old-age 
pension recipient status does not lead to a statistically significant finding. Despite the fact that 
the average amount of land owned by NE households is significantly lower, these units record  
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higher average values for household size and all age categories of household composition (with 
the exception of number of household members above the age of 60) when compared to their 
non-NE counterparts. On the other hand, the opposite is true concerning the comparisons of these 
characteristics across pension recipient and non-recipient households. 
  Figure 1 shows 2002 household NE and old-age pension participation rates by per capita 
consumption deciles. We observe the poverty-targeting nature of the NE program as the 
percentage of program recipient households declines significantly with consumption level. While 




respectively, the participation rates in the 8
th, 9
th and 10
th decile are 6.8, 1.7 and 3.8 percent, 
respectively. Conversely, household participation rates in old-age pension across consumption 




5. Empirical Methodology: 
  In order to compute unbiased estimates of the impact of a program on a set of outcomes, 
the researcher must estimate the counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened if the program 
had never been implemented. The estimation of the counterfactual is achieved by creating a 
control group, which is subsequently compared with a treatment group. The members of the 
control group should be identical to their counterparts in the treatment group in observed and 
unobserved characteristics, except for the fact that they do not participate in the program. For 
large enough samples, random assignment of an intervention would generate a control group that 
would be ex ante statistically indistinguishable from the treatment group. Control groups would 
then serve as sound counterfactuals, free from selection bias issues that often plague impact  
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evaluation efforts. Randomization also ensures that treatment is distributed independently of any 
other determinants of the outcome, which works towards eliminating omitted variable bias.  
  However, participation in anti-poverty programs, such as NE, is seldom random. Absent 
randomization, accounting for all observable and unobservable differences between the program 
recipients and non-recipients becomes essential for credible impact evaluations. Specifically, in 
order to compute consistent estimates of program impact, the researcher has to deal with 
estimation bias arising from (i) self-selection of treatment recipients, and (ii) nonrandom 
program placement, i.e. purposive program targeting based on a set of exogenous individual, 
household and/or community attributes. As is later, rationing in NE benefits increases the 
likelihood of finding non-participants in the data that are similar to the treated units in observable 
and unobservable characteristics. Thus, dealing with bias due to nonrandom program placement, 




5.1 Cross Sectional Analysis: 
We pool the ALSMS02 and ALSMS05 cross sections, and estimate, via propensity score 
matching (PSM), the separate effects of household participation in NE and old-age pension on 
household consumption and subjective measures of poverty.
13 Since consumption data was not 
                                                 
12 Household pension receipts mostly originate from pensioners’ contributions throughout the communist era when 
all employment was formal and workers automatically contributed to the pension fund. Thus, bias due to self-
selection should not be an issue for pension impact estimates.  
13The objective variables of welfare chosen as outcome variables in household cross sectional analysis are (i) a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a household is poor, (ii) poverty gap, (iii) poverty severity, (iv) real per capita monthly 
total consumption, and (v) real per capita monthly expenditures on food, nonfood, education, durables, and utilities. 
The following subjective measures of poverty, as evaluated by the household head, were used as outcome variables 
in cross sectional analysis: dummy variables equal to 1 if (i) household is satisfied with the current financial 
situation, (ii) the financial situation has improved in the past 3 years, (iii) the financial situation is expected to 
improve in the next 12 months, (iv) household overall consumption is adequate, (v) household food consumption is  
 
18
collected as part of the APS, we can only provide cross sectional analysis of the impact of social 
protection programs on poverty outcomes.  
Following Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we assume Y1i to be the outcome for household i 
when it is subject to treatment and Y0i to be the outcome for the same household i in the absence 
of the program. The treatment effect for a single unit, and the expected treatment effect for the 
treated population can be defined as τi = Y1i - Y0i and τ = E(Y1i | Ti = 1) – E(Y0i | Ti = 1), 
respectively, where Ti is equal to 1 if the ith unit is a program participant, and 0 otherwise. Since 
we do not observe outcomes that would have materialized if the participants had not been 
assigned treatment, E(Y0i | Ti = 1) is not estimable. As noted above, when treatment is randomly 
assigned to households, treatment status is independent of potential outcomes (Y1i, Y0i  ⊥Ti) 
such that E(Y0i | Ti = 0) =  E(Y0i | Ti = 1) = E(Yi | Ti = 0). This implies that the average treatment 
effect for the treated population is E(Yi | Ti = 1) – E(Yi | Ti = 0). If program assignment is not 
random but based on a vector of observable covariates, Xi, the distribution of Xi will not be 
independent of treatment status. However, conditional on observable covariates, we can assume 
assignment to treatment to have been random, such that Y1i, Y0i  ⊥Ti | Xi (conditional 
independence assumption). The average treatment effect is then expressed as τ = E(Yi | Ti = 1, Xi) 
– E(Yi | Ti = 0, Xi).  
  The basic idea behind PSM is to construct a control group with observable characteristics 
similar to attributes of program recipients. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that if 
outcomes are independent of program participation conditional on X, then outcomes are also 
independent of program participation conditional on the propensity score; P(Xi), which is the 
predicted probability of program participation given X.  
                                                                                                                                                             
adequate, (vi) household is satisfied with life, (vii) life has improved in the past 3 years, and (viii) life is expected to 
improve in the next 12 months.   
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  This study uses several methods to estimate of the average treatment effects (i) nearest 
neighbor matching with replacement, (ii) five-nearest neighbors matching with replacement, and 
(iii) kernel matching, as defined in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (HIT,1997). We use a caliper 
width of 0.001 for nearest neighbor and five nearest neighbor matching, and a bandwidth of 0.05 
for kernel matching.
14 We also report bootstrapped standard errors for all matching estimates and 
explore the heterogeneity of impact by urban/rural residence, and gender.  
  Intuitively, PSM creates the observational equivalent of an experiment in which everyone 
has the same probability of participation. PSM differs from randomization in that in PSM, it is 
the probability conditional on observed variables that is balanced across the treated and matched 
comparators, while randomization assures that the treatment and comparison groups are identical 
in terms of the distribution of all characteristics whether observed or not (Ravallion, 2005).
15 
Moreover, HIT (1997) state that the effectiveness of PSM partially depends on how well one can 
assure that treatment and comparison groups come from the same economic environment and 
were given the same survey instrument. Both conditions are fulfilled in our analysis.  
  HIT (1997) also note that two of three sources of estimation bias are eliminated via PSM. 
Firstly, bias due to differences in the supports of X in the treatment and control groups is 
eliminated if matching is conducted over the common support of P(Xi), as in this study. 
Secondly, bias due to differences between the two groups in the distribution of X over the 
common support is avoided by comparing treated units with comparators weighted according to 
the proximity of their propensity scores with respect to those of the treated. Only bias due to 
                                                 
14 Although we additionally used caliper widths of 0.01 and 0.0001 for nearest-neighbor and five-nearest neighbors 
matching, and bandwidths of 0.10 and 0.15 for kernel matching, these results are not reported due to space 
restrictions, but are available upon request. In any case, all our findings are robust to the choice of the matching 
estimator as well as the caliper width or bandwidth. 
15For each layer of matching analysis, we test whether the matching has been successful in balancing observables 
across the treatment and comparison groups. The balancing test only aids in model specification for a given set of X, 
but it cannot provide any proof as to whether the conditional independence assumption is fulfilled. We make sure 
that the balancing property is satisfied before the average treatment effects are estimated in this study.  
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differences in unobservable characteristics across groups may be an issue for impact estimates 
computed by PSM.  
5.1.1 Why Bias Due to Self-Selection Is Not Likely: 
  It is unfortunate that in the surveys households were not asked whether they applied for 
NE benefits, an information that could have helped control for possible unobservable differences 
between the treatment and comparison groups. Since the conditional independence assumption of 
PSM is empirically untestable, and that the internal validity of our matching estimates rely on the 
success of our efforts to eliminate selection bias, we present additional information in support of 
the counterfactual constructed via PSM. In Kolpeja (2006), NE administrators estimate that 
about 30-35 percent of applications are rejected due to (i) incompatibility with program criteria 
(5 percent), (ii) insufficient funds from the central government (15-20 percent), and (iii) 
provision of false information during the application process (10 percent). The existence of 
rationing in NE benefits to eligible Albanians, e.g. only 32.5 percent of the absolute poor receive 
NE (see table 7), allows us to find non-participants in the data set that are statistically 
indistinguishable from program participants in terms of observable and unobservable attributes. 
  Hence, we argue that our ability to deal with bias due to nonrandom program placement, 
as opposed to self-selection, should be the essential criterion for the consistency of our matching 
estimates. As the selection into the program at the local level is based on a set of observable 
household characteristics that were explained in section 3.1, controlling for observable 
differences between the treatment and comparison groups is crucial in computing impact 
estimates that are not plagued by nonrandom program placement. 
 
5.1.2 Dealing with Nonrandom Program Placement:  
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  The results of the probit regression of NE participation among the pooled sample of 
households are presented in Table 8. The mean propensity score is 0.14, and the predicted 
probabilities in the treatment group range from 0.0004 to 1. The scores of 71.2 percent of 7,239 
observations are in the range of common support, over which the matching is conducted.
1617 The 
specification passes the balancing test as explained above. It also encompasses a wealth of 
household and community characteristics that (i) are expected to be influential over household’s 
decision to apply for social assistance and (ii) are incorporated into decision-making processes of 
social administrators throughout their evaluations of social assistance applications and home 
visits paid to potential social assistance recipients.
18 By doing so, we are able to control for and 
match over observable covariates on which nonrandom program assignment is based.  
  Table 8 shows that both the numbers of working-age and above working-age household 
members unsurprisingly increase the likelihood of household participation in NE. Conversely, 
the number of employed household members is negatively associated with the probability of 
program participation. Since the likelihood of sustaining a livelihood and living out of poverty is 
closely related to the employment outcomes of work-eligible household members, this finding is 
also anticipated.  
  Being a single-headed household exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the probability of program participation, as single-headed households are often more prone to 
poverty outcomes. On the contrary, pension recipient households and those with heads of good 
heart condition are less likely to be program participants. These results are foreseen given that 
                                                 
16 For old-age pensions, the mean propensity score was 0.43, and the predicted probabilities in the treatment group 
ranged from 0.0071 to 1. Again, the scores of 71.2 percent of our sample were in the range of common support.  
17 Prior to the estimation of these propensity scores we also ran a probit regression of program participation using 
household variables pertaining to 1990 (i.e. before the establishment of the social assistance program). The results 
that obtain are very similar to those presented here and are available upon request. 
18 Household-level probit regressions of old-age pension participation use the exact set of covariates reported in 
Table 8.  
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the incidence of poverty in Albania has been shown to be less frequent among pension recipients 
than it is among NE participants, and that poor heart condition of a household head is likely to be 
associated with inadequate income generation, health costs and thereby poverty. The set of 
dwelling characteristics that enter into the report of the NE administrator following the home 
visit also assume statistically significant coefficients. The presence of a toilet, running water or a 
telephone as well as the number of dwelling rooms per capita are all negatively associated with 
the likelihood of program participation. Considering the lack of these amenities and crowding 
beyond the means of the dwelling are often indicative of poverty, these outcomes are predictable.  
  Additionally, a unit increase in the walking distance to the bus stop, which is included as 
an indicator for isolation from social services, reduces the probability of NE participation. 
Furthermore, we find that the total amount of social assistance funds to the commune exerts a 
positive effect on program participation.
19 It is reasonable that increases in allocations from the 
central government are likely to relieve the budgetary concerns of the communes regarding the 
extension of social assistance services, enabling them to extend coverage to more families in 
need. Lastly, the indicators for community-level poverty outcomes, such as the presence of 
cholera, hepatitis or HIV/AIDS in the community in the last 5 years, or living in communities 
with problems related to access to education, environment and drug abuse, are closely associated 
with NE participation. 
 
5.2 Panel Analysis: 
Following the large literature on the work disincentive effects of income transfer 
programs, we utilize the APS and static panel data models to explore the impact of household 
                                                 
19The data for social assistance fund allocations at the commune level were obtained for the 2002 and 2005 fiscal 
year from the Albanian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.  
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social transfers receipt from various programs on individual labor supply.
20 Heterogeneity of 
impact will be explored by gender, and through separate regressions for urban and rural 







’Tt + αi + εit 
where y*iht is the outcome of interest for individual i living in household h at time t. It will take 
different forms: latent when the focus is on employment status, and observed (possibly 
truncated) when the focus shifts toward hours and weeks of labor supplied in the past 7 days and 
12 months, respectively. Moreover, Siht is a vector of four variables equal to the value of monthly 
transfers received by each individual’s household from NE, old-age pension, labor invalidity 
pension and other social assistance schemes at time t. Xiht is a vector of other correlates that vary 
over individuals and time; Zih a vector of time-invariant variables that vary only over individuals; 
Tt is a vector of dummy variables capturing time-fixed effects; αi represents the time-invariant, 
unobserved individual effect; and εit is the disturbance term.
21  
  We also estimate first differencing models of hours and weeks of labor supplied in order 





’∆Xiht + ∆εit. 
Similar to the fixed effects models, first differencing estimator eliminates unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. If there are only two time periods, it yields results identical to those obtained 
through the fixed-effects estimator. When there are more than two time periods, the choice 
between the first differencing estimator and the fixed-effects estimator depends on the 
                                                 
20Dynamic models are not consider because of the small T (=3) of the panel. It is well established that at least four 
observations are necessary to consistently estimate parameters in dynamic panel models which account for state 
dependence, serial correlation, and neglected heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2005). 
21 As is well known, if regressors are correlated with αi, the fixed-effects estimator is consistent, while the random-
effects estimator is inconsistent. On the other hand, if regressors are uncorrelated with αi, the fixed-effects estimator 
is still consistent, though inefficient, whereas the random-effects estimator is both consistent and efficient 
(Wooldridge, 2005). We were always able to uphold the consistency and efficiency of the fixed effects estimator 
through Hausman specification tests. The results from the random effects models are available upon request.  
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assumptions concerning the error term. If errors are serially correlated across time, the first 
differencing estimator yields more efficient estimates (Wooldridge, 2005). We provide the 
results of serial auto-correlation tests that enable us to choose between the fixed effects and first 
differencing estimators.
22 
  Furthermore, when the employment status is the outcome of interest, the following 
equation completes the system: 
(2)  yiht = 1(y
*
iht > 0) 
The dependent variables of the discrete choice models of employment status will be dummy 
variables indicating (i) labor force participation, (ii) employment for a non-household member, 
(iii) employment on a farm owned or rented by household, and (iv) self-employment. An 
individual is considered as part of the labor force if she either has worked in the past 7 days, or 
has not worked in the past 7 days but holds a permanent job, or is unemployed but has actively 
looked for a job in the past 4 weeks.  
  The panel analysis of dichotomous outcomes dictates us to choose among a limited set of 
empirical models, namely the fixed effects linear probability model (LPM), the conditional fixed 
effects logit model (LFE), and the random effects probit model (PRM). We choose not to use the 
PRM due to its underlying assumption that unobserved effects and covariates are independent 
and that unobserved effects are normally distributed. Since this assumption is likely to be 
violated in our case, we expect PRM estimates to be inconsistent. Moreover, the LFE is not 
preferred given that it severely constrains our estimation sample by disregarding individuals that 
record either 1 or 0 for a dependent variable across all years. The LFE cannot be conceptualized 
                                                 
22Under the null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation, the residuals from the regression of first-differenced 
variables should have an autocorrelation of -0.5. This implies that the coefficient on lagged residuals in a regression 
of lagged residuals on current residuals should be -0.5. Wooldridge test of autocorrelation performs a Wald test of 
this hypothesis. If the resulting F-test statistic is significant, the first differencing estimator yields more efficient 
estimates in comparison to the fixed-effects estimator.  
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as a traditional fixed effects estimator anyway, since it does not actually estimate individual 
unobserved effects along with regression coefficients. “Sometimes the conditional MLE 
[maximum likelihood estimation] is described as ‘conditioning on the observed effects in the 
sample.’ This description is misleading.” (Wooldridge, 2005, p. 492) Wooldridge (2005) also 
shows that we cannot estimate average partial effects unless a distribution is specified for 
individual unobserved effects. 
  Considering the critical disadvantages of the PRM and LFE, our discrete model choice is 
the LPM. As is well known, the LPM is subject to the criticism of generating fitted values that 
are outside the unit interval. The model also implies that a ceteris paribus unit increase in a 
covariate leads the predicted probability conditional on all covariates to change by the same 
amount, regardless of the initial value of the covariate that is subject to the unit increase. On the 
other hand, the LPM provides semi-parametric identification, and successfully accounts for 
potential correlation between individual unobservable heterogeneity and covariates. Furthermore, 
it yields good estimates of marginal effects on the response probability near the center of the 
distribution of independent variables. If the researcher wants to assess how good the estimates of 
marginal effects are, the coefficients from the LPM can be compared with the marginal effects 
estimated from non-linear models. “If the main purpose is to estimate the partial effect of a 
covariate on the response probability, averaged across the distribution of x, then the fact that 
some predicted values are outside the unit interval may not be very important.” (Wooldridge, 
2005, p. 455)  
 
6. Results and Discussion: 
6.1 Cross Sectional Results:  
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  The household-level matching findings reported in this section are consistent across 
different matching estimators as well as different caliper widths/bandwidths used for each 
matching estimator. Only the results using the nearest-five neighbors matching estimator are 
reported in table 9. Results using the nearest neighbor and kernel estimator are very similar and 
available upon request. The results in Table 9 show differences in welfare between comparable 
NE and old-age pension transfer recipient and non-recipient households. Table 9 also shows the 
results when the urban and rural samples are considered separately. At the very least, anti-
poverty program administrators would like to see no difference in average expenditure outcomes 
across treatment and comparison groups. The fact that the average value of real per capita 
monthly expenditure for the treated units is 1,037 Lek less than the figure for the matched 
comparators is worrisome.
23, 24 The matching analysis shows that while NE participants record 
lower figures in all expenditure categories, the difference in overall consumption across the 
treatment and comparison groups appears to be driven by the trends in food and nonfood 
expenditures. Specifically, the mean differences in the category of real per capita food and non-
food expenditures are both estimated at -423 Lek. These estimates are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level.  
  NE households are also less likely to (i) be satisfied with the current financial situation or 
life, (ii) think that the financial situation or life has improved in the past 3 years, (iii) believe that 
the current financial situation or life will improve in the next 12 months, and (iv) find overall and 
food consumption to be adequate. Exploring the heterogeneity of program impact by urban/rural 
                                                 
23The 2002 average difference in per capita consumption between NE participant and non-participant households 
was -3200 Lek, as reported in Table 5. In absolute terms, this figure is surely an overestimate of the actual program 
impact recovered from the PSM analysis. 
24A confounding problem for the household-level matching estimates may be that income- or consumption-related 
poverty, which is the main outcome of interest, is also incorporated in the decision of the social administrator in 
order to determine the eligibility of an applicant household. However, the extensive set of variables included in the 
program participation regression should be adequate enough to reflect the welfare of sample households, rendering 
the potential problem irrelevant.   
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residence in columns (2) and (3), we observe that the negative impact on consumption (in terms 
of its magnitude) is primarily driven by urban households. In terms of statistical significance, the 
matching results are much more consistent across different matching estimators for the urban 
sample. Under nearest-five neighbors matching, the mean difference in real per capita monthly 
expenditure is -1,349 and -977 Lek in urban and rural areas, respectively. Both differences are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
  Conversely, as presented in the 4
th column of Table 9, with the exception of a modest 
negative (positive) impact of pension participation on household’s education (non-food) 
expenditure, household old-age pension recipient status does not exert any statistically 
significant impact on the outcomes considered in PSM. Splitting the sample into urban and rural 
areas, the impact of household participation in old-age pensions becomes even less significant. 
Indeed, columns (5) and (6) show that pension and non-pension households are similar across all 
variables except for their perception of their financial situation over the last three years where 
non-pension rural households think they fared worse.  
 
6.2 Panel Analysis:   
  One hypothesis is that the higher incidence of poverty among NE households partially 
stems from transfer-induced reduction in labor supply of their members. Tables 10 and 11 report 
the results from the fixed effects models of hours worked in the past 7 days and weeks worked in 
the past 12 months, respectively.  The models are estimated at the individual level, separately for 
the entire, rural and urban samples. In each layer of analysis, separate regressions were run for 
men and women. All specifications control for a number of time-variant individual and  
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household-level characteristics, as well as individual- and year-fixed effects. Social protection 
receipts are measured monthly, at the household-level.  
  Intensive Margin Results: The findings for the entire sample suggest that labor supply 
response to NE assistance is strong and negative. The coefficients from the fixed effects models 
estimated using the entire sample imply that a ceteris paribus 2400 Lek (the average monthly NE 
transfer value among program participants in 2002) increase in NE receipts reduces individual 
labor supply by 1.6 hours per week and 2.2 weeks per year. The negative labor supply response 
to NE transfers is completely driven by female workers. Indeed, the coefficient for males is not 
statistically significant.
25 Tables 10 and 11 also present the impact estimates differentiated by 
urban/rural residence. We find that on average, a 2400 Lek upsurge in NE receipts generates a 
reduction of 2.7 and 2.9 units in hours and weeks worked, respectively, among urban individuals. 
By contrast, it is interesting to note that the receipt of NE has no impact on the amount of labor 
supplied by rural workers, male or female. In the end, one notes that the receipt of NE adversely 
impacts the labor supply of urban female workers only who reduce their effort by 2.8 hours a 
week and 2.8 weeks a year on average. 
  The sizeable adjustment of hours and weeks worked by individuals in response to 
household NE receipts stand in stark contrast to the labor supply trends among individuals living 
in households with pensioners. Despite being almost three times higher than NE transfers, old-
age pension receipts fail to exert any statistically significant impact on hours and weeks of labor 
that individuals supply. Tables 10 and 11, however, show that female labor supply is still 
vulnerable to social transfers in the urban areas. Indeed, pension receipts reduce the hours and 
weeks urban women work albeit at a much smaller extent than NE transfers. Moreover, this 
                                                 
25 Males reduce their supply of labor also after receiving NE if one keeps heads of household in the sample. These 
results are available upon request.  
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negative impact disappears for the number of hours worked when the first differences are 
considered as shown in Table 12. However, all the other results obtained with the first-
differencing models are consistent with the fixed effects results discussed above.
26 The p-values 
from serial autocorrelation tests in Tables 10 and 11 actually indicate that first-differencing 
would yield more efficient estimates in comparison to the fixed-effects estimator. 
  In section 3, we noted our expectation concerning work disincentive effects of income 
transfers to be prominent in the presence of widespread unemployment, inadequate employment 
generation, and a high degree of worker discouragement, i.e. in urban areas and among females. 
This is fully supported by our intensive margin findings, which indicate unequivocal differences 
in individual labor supply response to household NE receipts. Considering that the effects of NE 
on household welfare and individual labor supply are both negative and primarily driven by the 
outcomes in urban areas, it is probable that the negative impact of program participation on 
household welfare is realized through negative individual labor response to household NE 
receipts in areas with weak labor demand and abundance of unemployed individuals who are 
likely to gain initial entry into the labor market at relatively low paid occupations. 
  Extensive Margin Results: Thus far, we have looked at the intensive margin results 
which show how individuals adjust the number of hours and weeks of work they supply upon the 
receipt of NE, pension and/or other transfers. However, transfer receipts can also influence the 
decision to work. In Albania, one distinguishes between three types of work (i) work for a non-
household member, (ii) work on the household’s farm, and (iii) work on own non-farm business. 
                                                 
26 When we estimated either the fixed-effect or the first differencing model of hours and weeks worked for the entire 
sample with four dummy variables indicating whether a household received any transfers from the four social 
protection regimes considered, the results were very comparable, in terms of statistical significance and magnitude, 
to the findings from the individual-level matching that we conducted among work-eligible individuals from 
ALSMS02 and ALSMS05. Although these results are not reported here, they are available upon request. In any case, 
this observation may be supportive of the internal validity of the matching estimates.  
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An individual is said to be working if she chooses either of the three options. We estimate the 
effects of household social protection receipts on individuals’ likelihood of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
working. The LPMs of these binary outcomes are presented in Tables 13 thru 16. All models are 
again estimated for the entire, rural and urban samples. In each layer of analysis, separate 
regressions are run for men and women.  
  We start with Table 13 and discussing the results from the regressions estimated using all 
individuals. For the entire and the urban sample, we find that in response to a ceteris paribus 
increase of 2400 Lek in NE transfers, the probability of labor force participation decreases by 5.8 
percent. These results appear to be driven by the behavioral responses among females. The 
negative and statistically significant coefficient of household old-age pension receipts in these 
regressions is notably small in magnitude. In contrast, neither household NE nor old-age pension 
income is a significant determinant of labor force participation decision of rural individuals. 
Gendered and urban/rural differences in labor force participation can be explained by the same 
reasoning provided in discussion of the intensive margin results. In reference to the comparable 
elasticities presented in tables 10 and 11, the elasticities in table 13 indicate that the negative 
labor supply response to household NE receipts is concentrated at the extensive margin. 
Moreover, with the exception of the rural regressions, the LPM yields a quite reasonable number 
of fitted values lying outside the unit interval.  
  Table 14 presents the regression results concerning the likelihood of working for a non-
household member. With respect to NE receipts the results are almost identical to those obtained 
with the overall labor force participation model, the impact becomes slightly stronger. On the 
other hand, old-age pension transfers either loose their statistically significant impact all the way 
and in the few cases the impact remains significant, it becomes much weaker as is the case for  
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urban women for instance. The rural LPMs also perform significantly better in terms the number 
of fitted values lying outside the unit interval. 
Finally, tables 15 and 16 report the regression results regarding the probability of working 
on a farm rented or owned by the household, and working on own account, respectively. We 
observe that the LPMs presented in these tables perform poorer, placing the validity of their 
estimates under scrutiny. Generally, we are unable to detect uncontested and significant 
coefficients for household NE or old-age pension receipts, regardless of sample definition and/or 
gender. Hence, we can say that the estimated impact of household NE receipts on labor force 
participation appears to be concentrated on urban women who have opportunities to take-up a 
job outside the household. 
 
7. Conclusion: 
  Although Albania’s recent economic growth has reduced poverty levels substantially, the 
fraction of the population below a poverty line that is about USD 2 per person per day still stood 
at 18.5 percent in 2005. As evaluating the performance of Albanian social protection programs is 
vital to the efforts of anti-poverty policymakers, this study serves as the first systematic impact 
evaluation of the Ndihma Ekonomike social assistance program, and the old-age pensions, i.e. 
the central elements of the Albanian social protection system. In this respect, we do not find 
statistically significant average differences in all welfare outcomes of interest across pension 
households and their pension non-recipient comparators. In contrast, NE households, on average, 
record lower per capita consumption and exhibit a higher degree of discontent with life, financial 
situation, and consumption levels in comparison to their non-NE counterparts. Exploring the 
heterogeneity of impact by urban/rural residence allows us to state that the alarming differences  
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between NE treatment and comparison groups are principally driven by the trends in urban areas. 
We should note a possible confounding problem for the household-level matching estimates, as 
income- or consumption-related poverty, which is the main outcome of interest, is also 
incorporated in the decision of the social administrator in order to determine the eligibility of an 
applicant household. However, the extensive set of variables included in the program 
participation regression should be adequate to reflect the welfare of the sample households, 
rendering the potential problem irrelevant. 
One unintended consequence of income transfers, which has been cited as a possible 
mechanism through which transfer programs can create poverty traps, is the negative labor 
response to program participation. In our quest for a possible explanation of the results 
concerning the effects of program participation on welfare outcomes, we consider the impact of 
household receipts from the above programs on work-eligible individuals’ labor supply at the 
extensive and intensive margins. Our panel estimates indicate that on the whole, the individual 
labor supply response, either in terms of the likelihood of labor force participation or hours and 
weeks worked, to household NE receipts is large and negative. The negative labor supply 
response is stronger among women, and is present only in urban areas, where the levels of 
unemployment and long-term unemployment have been substantially higher compared to rural 
areas, and the formal labor demand has been quite weak in the post-transition era. In contrast, 
household pension receipts do not appear to influence any of the labor outcomes. These results 
are in line with the program impacts on welfare outcomes.  
The panel findings may be subject to scrutiny in two ways. First, the household head is 
required to be unemployed for an eligible household to receive social assistance. One may claim 
that the panel coefficients on household NE receipts may suffer from endogeneity bias since the  
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reduction in the labor supply of the sample members that are household heads is the inevitable 
consequence of program participation. To counteract this criticism, we also estimated the panel 
models, excluding the household heads. The changes in the coefficients (in terms of magnitude 
and statistical significance) in all models, with the exception of male regressions, were trivial. In 
male regressions, the coefficients that were significant before became insignificant. This is most 
likely due to the reduction in the male sample size with the elimination of the household heads. 
The results from the regressions estimated without the household heads are available upon 
request. Secondly, if individuals become unemployed or cut down their labor supply in an 
attempt to reduce household income and become eligible for NE benefits, the panel results may 
be biased due to reverse causality. However, this scenario is not likely to plague our estimates 
since Albanian labor markets are highly informal, as presented in section 1.3, and that only 
formal sector earnings of households can be tracked and incorporated into calculations of social 
administrators to determine household eligibility status.  
  The impact estimates at the household- and individual-level indicate a few areas ripe for 
policy revision. The requirement of the unemployment of a household head throughout 
participation in the NE program may not foster the development of healthy working habits 
among remaining work-eligible household members. Therefore, this requirement should be 
dropped. In addition, one should recall that there is no time limit on receiving NE benefits. It is 
possible that the dependency on social assistance, the impacts on household welfare, and the 
severity of the negative labor supply response may differ across NE recipients in terms of the 
time spent as part of the program. This possibility should be explored before prescribing the 
dissolution of the program based on our findings on its negative impacts on household welfare. 
On the one hand, the welfare reduction may be more severe among older program participants,  
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as they may have exhibited greater dependence on welfare over years, and their negative labor 
supply response may have grown stronger with respect to newer NE beneficiaries. If so, time 
limits on NE eligibility may be considered.  
  On the other hand, older program participants may not even need the program as much as 
their newer counterparts. For instance, even if a household may have been eligible for NE and 
started receiving transfers at the inception of the program in 1995, it is not for certain that the 
household is still poor or in need of social assistance by 2002 or 2005. If so, this group of 
households is likely to contribute to the leakage rate of the program, measured in terms of the 
percentage of non-poor that are NE participants. If the pool of NE beneficiaries is further 
restricted in order to extend benefits to the households in greatest need, the average benefit level 
will subsequently increase, and the desired impact on household welfare may be achieved.  
  Furthermore, it is possible that the NE transfers may need to be larger if there are 
nonlinearities in amounts. A small transfer may not yield the desired impact on household 
objective or subjective measures of welfare, but doubling the transfer may more than double the 
impact. The lack of impact may in fact stem from the inadequacy of the funding. While the 
available data sources do not allow us to explore this possibility, panel data on household welfare 
would be useful to address the question.  
  In any case, the revisions in the program administration in order to extend benefits to 
households in greatest need, achieve a positive impact on household welfare, and reduce work 
disincentives should be matched with efforts to expand employment, particularly in urban areas. 
This is especially true since NE benefit in itself is often not as high as potential wage or self-
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Table 1: Government Expenditure on Social Protection, 2005 
   Program Cost  Share of Total Social  Share of  
Program  (Billion Lek)  Protection Spending (%)  GDP (%) 
Social Insurance  45.2 76.0  5.4 
   Pensions  40.2  68.0  4.8 
   Compensations for Rural Pensions  0.5  1.0  0.1 
   Compensations for Urban Pensions  2.7  5.0  0.3 
   Allowances Over Veterans' Pensions  0.8  1.0  0.1 
   Maternity Benefit  0.8  1.0  0.1 
   All Other  0.2  0.0  0.0 
Social Assistance  11.1 19.0  1.2 
   Ndihma Ekonomike  3.3  6.0  0.4 
   Disability Benefits  6.1  10.0  0.6 
   Social Care Institutions  0.5  1.0  0.1 
   All Other  1.2  2.0  0.1 
Labor Market Programs  1.2 2.0  0.1 
   Employment Promotion Programs  0.1  0.0  0.0 
   Unemployment Benefit  0.9  2.0  0.1 
   Vocational Training  0.2  0.0  0.0 
Administrative Costs  1.5 3.0  0.2 
Total  59.0 100.0  6.9 




Table 2: Annual Registered Employment by Sector & Gender  
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Total Employment  1,137,829 1,115,760 1,107,677 1,085,104 1,065,104 1,068,190 920,569 920,144 926,225 931,217 932,102 935,058 
                    
S e c t o r                     
Agriculture Private Sector  750,000  761,000  761,000 761,000 761,000 761,000  526,337  526,337 533,639 542,152 542,152 542,000 
(in %)  65.9 68.2 68.7 70.1 71.4 71.2  57.2 57.2 57.6 58.2 58.2 58.0 
                    
Public  Sector  275,887 238,850 226,295 212,750 201,429 191,166  188,965  186,065  181,417 176,065 175,015 169,000 
(in %)  24.2 21.4 20.4 19.6 18.9 17.9  20.5 20.2 19.6 18.9 18.8 18.1 
                    
Non-Agriculture Private Sector  111,942  115,910  120,382 111,354 102,675 116,024  205,267  207,742 211,169 213,000 214,935 224,058 
(in %)  9.8 10.4  10.9  10.3 9.6 10.9  22.3 22.6 22.8 22.9 23.1 24.0 
                    
Employment Rate  62.5 60.3 59.0 57.0 56.0  55.1  51.9 51.1 50.7 50.3  49.7 48.7 
Male  74.7 72.6 74.0 71.0 69.0  66.0  63.8 62.8 61.4 61.2  60.0 58.8 
Female  50.2 47.9 45.0 43.0 42.0 44.1  39.4  38.9  38.2  38.9  38.8 38.1 





Table 3: LSMS Labor Market Outcomes by Rural/Urban Residence (2002-2004) 
   2002 2003 2004 
Outcomes  National  Rural Urban National  Rural Urban National  Rural Urban 
Labor Force Participation Rate - Relaxed  70.8 77.6  62.8 69.9 76.8 61.6  69.4  74.9 62.9 
Labor Force Participation Rate - Standard 65.2  74.4  54.3  65.4  73.5 55.8  63.7  71  54.8 
Unemployment Rate - Relaxed  17.3  5.6 20.1  12.9  5.1 13.6 13.4 5.6  13.8 
Unemployment Rate - Standard  10.2 2.4  11.5 6.9  1.8  7.9  5.6  1.7  5.9 
Long-Term Unemployment Rate  58.3  52.7 59.7  73.4  58.3 77.4 68.4 56.4  72.7 
Employment Rate  58.5  72  42.8 60.9 71.8  47.9 60.1 69.3  49 











Source: World Bank (2006b); Population: Individuals between 15 and 64 years of age; Long-Term Unemployment: Being Unemployed 12+ months.
Table 4: LSMS Labor Market Outcomes by Gender (2002-2004) 
  2002 National  2002 Rural  2002 Urban 
Outcomes  Men  Women  Men  Women  Men  Women 
Labor Force Participation Rate - Relaxed  82.6 60.4 87.3 69.2 77.2 49.8 
Labor Force Participation Rate - Standard 77.0  54.8  84.1 66.0 68.7 41.2 
Unemployment Rate - Relaxed  16.8 17.9  7.6  6.9  28.7 36.4 
Unemployment Rate - Standard  10.7  9.5 4.0 2.4  20.0  23.2 
Long-Term Unemployment Rate  56.1 61.4 47.3 62.7 58.6 61.2 
Employment Rate  68.7  49.6 80.7 64.4 55.0 31.7 
   2003 National  2003 Rural  2003 Urban 
Labor Force Participation Rate - Relaxed  81.6 59.2 86.6 68.2 75.7 48.3 
Labor Force Participation Rate - Standard 77.7  54.2  83.9 64.3 70.6 41.9 
Unemployment Rate - Relaxed  11.4 14.6  5.9  7.4  18.8 27.1 
Unemployment Rate - Standard  7.1 6.7 2.8 1.9  12.9  15.9 
Long-Term Unemployment Rate  68.8 79.6 63.2 49.6 70.5 86.2 
Employment Rate  72.2  50.6 81.5 63.1 61.5 35.2 
   2004 National  2004 Rural  2004 Urban 
Labor Force Participation Rate - Relaxed  81.1  58.7  86.1  64.7 75.0 51.3 
Labor Force Participation Rate - Standard  76.0  52.4  82.4  60.7 68.3 42.1 
Unemployment Rate - Relaxed  11.2  16.1  6.9  8.1 17.1  28.7 
Unemployment Rate - Standard  5.3  6.0  2.8  2.0 9.0  13.2 
Long-Term Unemployment Rate  65.4  72.0  51.6  64.9 71.5 73.9 
Employment Rate  72.0  49.2  80.1  59.5 62.2 36.6  
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Table 5: 2002 Means & P-Values from Tests of Mean Differences By NE Household Status 
   Entire Sample  Non-Recipient  Recipient  Difference  P-Value 
Individual Characteristics           
Male  ∆ 0.255  0.263  0.204  0.059  0.027 
Age (Years)  32.90  33.19  30.94  2.25  0.001 
Years of Education  9.32 9.46 8.44  1.01  0.000 
Married  ∆ 0.701  0.699  0.714  -0.015  0.593 
Hours Worked (Past 7 Days)  21.38  22.52  13.80  8.72  0.000 
Weeks Worked (Past 12 Months)  22.49  23.86  13.37  10.48  0.000 
Worked Past 7 days  ∆ 0.568  0.595  0.388  0.206  0.000 
Works for a Non-HH Member  ∆ 0.187  0.210  0.033  0.177  0.000 
Works on Own Account  ∆ 0.050  0.052  0.036  0.016  0.229 
Works on HH Farm  ∆ 0.345  0.348  0.322  0.026  0.378 
Observations  2329  2025 (86.95%)  304 (13.05%)       
   Entire Sample  Non-Recipient  Recipient  Difference  P-Value 
Household Consumption Profile         
Absolute Poor  ∆ 0.19  0.16  0.43  -0.26  0.000 
Per Capita Consumption 8762.48  9115.62  5918.00  3197.63  0.000 
          
Monthly Household Social Protection Receipts        
Ndihma Ekonomike (100s)  263.94 0.00  2389.90  -2389.90  0.000 
Old Age Pension (100s)  2809.96  3037.70  975.57  2062.13  0.000 
          
Household Characteristics           
Head of HH: Age (Years)  51.10  51.96  44.15  7.81  0.000 
Years of Education Head of HH   8.74  8.84  7.98  0.86  0.000 
Head of HH: Employed  ∆ 0.65  0.66  0.63  0.03  0.292 
Head of HH: Female  ∆ 0.12  0.13  0.11  0.02  0.365 
Head of HH: Albanian  ∆ 0.98  0.98  0.99  -0.01  0.124 
Household Size  4.28  4.21  4.86  -0.66  0.000 
# of HH Members [0,5]  0.54  0.49  0.88  -0.39  0.000 
# of HH Members [6,14]  0.70 0.66 1.01  -0.34  0.000 
# of HH Members [15,60]  2.47 2.44 2.71  -0.27  0.000 
# of HH Members 60+  0.53 0.56 0.25  0.31  0.000 
# of Employed HH Members 1.64  1.67  1.40  0.27  0.000 
Number of Agricultural Plots  2.02  1.99  2.26  -0.27  0.166 
Land Area (Sq. Meters) 3976.62  4219.18  2022.92  2196.25  0.000 
Dwelling: Brick  ∆ 0.58  0.58  0.56  0.02  0.466 
Dwelling: Toilet Inside  ∆ 0.61  0.63  0.47  0.16  0.000 
Dwelling: Running Water  ∆ 0.53  0.55  0.42  0.13  0.000 
Dwelling: Electric Meter  ∆ 0.67  0.68  0.62  0.06  0.040 
Dwelling: Telephone  ∆ 0.23  0.24  0.13  0.12  0.000 
Distance to Primary School (Minutes) 12.80  12.50  15.22  -2.72  0.000 
Distance to Ambulatory (Minutes) 18.50  17.89  23.47  -5.59  0.000 
Distance to Bus Stop (Minutes) 17.14  16.58  21.68  -5.11  0.000 
Rural  ∆ 0.54  0.54  0.56  -0.02  0.407 
Coastal  ∆ 0.32  0.33  0.17  0.17  0.000 
Central  ∆ 0.46  0.45  0.49  -0.04  0.171 
Mountain  ∆ 0.10  0.07  0.31  -0.23  0.000 
Tirana  ∆ 0.13  0.14  0.03  0.10  0.000 




Table 6: 2002 Means & P-Values from Tests of Mean Differences By Old-Age Pension Household Status 
   Entire Sample  Non-Recipient  Recipient  Difference  P-Value 
Individual Characteristics           
Male  ∆ 0.255  0.184  0.363  -0.179  0.000 
Age (Years)  32.90  32.86  32.95  -0.09  0.849 
Years of Education  9.32 9.22 9.48  -0.26  0.046 
Married  ∆ 0.701  0.719  0.673  0.046  0.019 
Hours Worked (Past 7 Days)  21.38  19.68  23.92  -4.24  0.000 
Weeks Worked (Past 12 Months)  22.49  21.45  24.03  -2.58  0.007 
Worked Past 7 days  ∆ 0.568  0.539  0.610  -0.071  0.001 
Works for a Non-HH Member  ∆ 0.187  0.171  0.210  -0.039  0.019 
Works on Own Account  ∆ 0.050  0.049  0.051  -0.002  0.835 
Works on HH Farm ∆ 0.345  0.335  0.360  -0.025  0.214 
Observations  2329  1395 (59.9%)  934 (40.1%)       
   Entire Sample  Non-Recipient  Recipient  Difference  P-Value 
Household Consumption Profile         
Absolute Poor  ∆ 0.19  0.20  0.18  0.03  0.078 
Per Capita Consumption  8762.48 8661.17 8909.32  -248.16  0.180 
          
Monthly Household Social Protection Receipts        
Ndihma Ekonomike (100s) 263.94  368.97  111.71  257.26  0.000 
Old Age Pension (100s)  2809.96  0.00  6882.63  -6882.63  0.000 
          
Household Characteristics           
Head of HH: Age (Years)  51.10  44.26  61.01  -16.74  0.000 
Years of Education Head of HH   8.74  9.71  7.33  2.38  0.000 
Head of HH: Employed  ∆ 0.65  0.81  0.43  0.38  0.000 
Head of HH: Female  ∆ 0.12  0.10  0.16  -0.07  0.000 
Head of HH: Albanian  ∆ 0.98  0.98  0.98  0.01  0.278 
Household Size  4.28  4.29  4.27  0.01  0.871 
# of HH Members [0,5]  0.54  0.58  0.47  0.11  0.001 
# of HH Members [6,14] 0.70  0.88  0.45  0.43  0.000 
# of HH Members [15,60] 2.47  2.76  2.06  0.69  0.000 
# of HH Members 60+  0.53 0.06 1.20  -1.14  0.000 
# of Employed HH Members 1.64  1.72  1.52  0.21  0.000 
Number of Agricultural Plots  2.02  1.92  2.15  -0.23  0.045 
Land Area (Sq. Meters)  3976.62 3578.60 4553.52  -974.92  0.000 
Dwelling: Brick  ∆ 0.58  0.57  0.60  -0.03  0.095 
Dwelling: Toilet Inside  ∆ 0.61  0.60  0.63  -0.03  0.078 
Dwelling: Running Water  ∆ 0.53  0.52  0.54  -0.02  0.312 
Dwelling: Electric Meter  ∆ 0.67  0.65  0.70  -0.05  0.015 
Dwelling: Telephone  ∆ 0.23  0.21  0.26  -0.05  0.001 
Distance to Primary School (Minutes) 12.80  13.08 12.40  0.68  0.160 
Distance to Ambulatory (Minutes) 18.50  18.55  18.44  0.11  0.872 
Distance to Bus Stop (Minutes) 17.14  17.35  16.84  0.52  0.527 
Rural  ∆ 0.54  0.55  0.54  0.01  0.676 
Coastal  ∆ 0.32  0.33  0.30  0.02  0.171 
Central  ∆ 0.46  0.44  0.48  -0.03  0.103 
Mountain  ∆ 0.10  0.11  0.09  0.01  0.064 
Tirana  ∆ 0.13  0.13  0.13  0.00  0.648 






Table 7: NE Coverage & Leakage Rates (2002-2005) 
   National Urban  Rural 
    2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 
% of Poor in NE (Coverage)  24.6 32.5 26.3 32.9 23.7 32.4 
% of Non-poor in NE (Leakage)  7.8 9.5 7.9 6.3 7.7  12.7 
 
 
Figure 1: 2002 Household Ndihma Ekonomike and Old-Age Pension Participation 
Rates by Per Capita Consumption Deciles















































Table 8: Probit Results (Dependent Variable = 1 if HH Participates in Ndihma Ekonomike) 
Household Human Capital  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Single Headed HH  0.233 [0.109]** 
HH Head Age (Years)  0.052 [0.019]*** 
HH Head Age Squared  -0.001 [0.000]*** 
HH Head Age Cubed  0.000 [0.000]*** 
HH Highest Years of Education  0.170 [0.075]** 
# of HH Members Above Working Age  0.510 [0.271]* 
# of HH Members Above Working Age Squared  -0.521 [0.296]* 
# of HH Members Above Working Age Cubed  0.154 [0.082]* 
# of HH Members Working Age  0.449 [0.128]*** 
# of HH Members Working Age Squared  -0.078 [0.032]** 
# of HH Members Working Age Cubed  0.005 [0.002]** 
# of HH Members Employed  -0.792 [0.090]*** 
# of HH Members Employed Squared  0.251 [0.040]*** 
# of HH Members Employed Cubed  -0.025 [0.005]*** 
HH Head Heart Condition Good | Very Good  -0.234 [0.059]*** 
A HH Member Has a Chronic Disease Lasted + 3 Months  0.096 [0.056]* 
=1 if HH Receives Income from Old Age Pensions  -0.705 [0.091]*** 
    
Household Agricultural Asset Position     
Land Owned (Sq. Meters)  0.000  [0.0000]*** 
Land Owned Squared  0.000  [0.0000]*** 
Land Owned Cubed  0.000  [0.0000]*** 
    
Dwelling Characteristics     
Dwelling Has Toilet  -0.295 [0.066]*** 
Dwelling Has Electricity Meter  0.134 [0.063]** 
Dwelling Has Telephone  -0.233 [0.071]*** 
Dwelling Living Conditions: Appropriate  -0.119 [0.068]* 
Dwelling Rooms Per Capita  -0.378 [0.083]*** 
HH Uses Electricity for Heating  -0.283 [0.161]* 
HH Uses Gas for Heating  -0.268 [0.150]* 
    
Community Characteristics: Basics     
Community Road Conditions Improved Last 5 Years  -0.112 [0.067]* 
    
Community Characteristics: Access to Public Services     
Present in Community: Private Hospital  0.504 [0.141]*** 
Present in Community: Labor Office  0.298 [0.107]*** 
Present in Community: Market  0.253 [0.118]** 
Present in Community: Mosque/Church  0.126 [0.072]* 
Present in Community: Community Room  -0.138 [0.084]* 
    
Community Characteristics: Education Services     
Community Primary School Newly Built or Substantially Improved  0.148 [0.071]** 
# of Community Primary School Students  0.000 [0.000]*** 
# of Community Primary School Teachers  0.002 [0.001]* 
Community Primary School Has Toilet  -0.248 [0.102]** 
Community Primary School Has Water  -0.267 [0.089]*** 
Community Primary School Has Electricity  0.193 [0.099]* 
Community Secondary School Newly Built or Substantially Improved  -0.176 [0.086]**  
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Community Secondary School Has Water  0.221 [0.108]** 
Community Secondary School Has Electricity  -0.221 [0.123]* 
Community Secondary School Has More Boys  0.167 [0.090]* 
Table 8 (Continued) 
Community Characteristics: Health Services    
Community Health Center Open Every Day  -0.246  [0.095]*** 
Community Health Center Has Sufficient Instruments  0.135  [0.079]* 
    
Community Characteristics: Community Services    
Functional Public Lighting in Community  0.234  [0.116]** 
Functional Sewage in Community  0.177  [0.099]* 
Functional Garbage Collection in Community  0.279  [0.144]* 
Functional Public Phone in Community  -0.259  [0.144]* 
    
Community Characteristics: Organization     
Farmer's Group Exists in Community  -0.155  [0.087]* 
Sports Group Exists in Community  -0.278  [0.096]*** 
Neighborhood Committee Exists in Community  0.234  [0.077]*** 
    
Community Characteristics: Concerns & Safety     
1st Major concern in Community: Safety  -0.249  [0.143]* 
1st Major concern in Community: Access to Education  0.387  [0.204]* 
1st Major concern in Community: Transport  0.298  [0.161]* 
1st Major concern in Community: Environment  0.370  [0.123]*** 
Problem in Community: Alcobol Abuse  -0.261  [0.089]*** 
Crime in Community: Sale of Illicit Drugs  0.355  [0.166]** 
    
Community Characteristics: Environment     
Cholera in Community Last 5 Years  0.462  [0.254]* 
Hepatitis in Community Last 5 Years  0.196  [0.077]** 
HIV/AIDS in Community Last 5 Years  0.356  [0.163]** 
Community Environment Improved Last 5 Years  0.138  [0.066]** 
    
Year Fixed Effects    
2005  0.212 [0.077]*** 
    
Regional Fixed Effects     
Prefecture #3  -1.120  [0.220]*** 
Prefecture #5  -0.698  [0.183]*** 
Prefecture #6  -0.481  [0.254]* 
Prefecture #8  0.546  [0.180]*** 
Prefecture #11  -0.942  [0.194]*** 
Prefecture #12  -1.314  [0.215]*** 
Observations 7237 
Pseudo R2  0.360 
 
Note: Only statistically significant variables are reported, even though the specification entailed 53 and 110 variables at the 
household- and community-level, respectively. */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level, respectively. Standard 
errors are in brackets.  
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Table 9: Impact of HH Participation in NE and Old-Age Pension on Objective and Subjective Measures of Welfare 
Outcome Variables  Ndhima Ekonomike  Old-Age Pension Program 
   All Urban  Rural All Urban  Rural 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Absolute Poor ∆  0.076 0.107 0.059 0.004  0.000 0.024 
  [0.022]*** [0.040]***  [0.043]  [0.039]  [0.043] [0.060] 
Poverty Gap  0.017 0.024 0.013 0.000  0.003 0.014 
  [0.007]** [0.010]**  [0.015]  [0.011]  [0.006] [0.013] 
Poverty Severity  0.005 0.007 0.004 -0.004  0.001 0.003 
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007]  [0.002] [0.006] 
Real Per Capita Expenditure  -1,036.61 -1,348.64 -976.976  -107.163  -515.217 -253.245 
  [224.986]*** [321.667]*** [293.445]***  [447.487]  [710.123] [503.937] 
Real Per Capita Food Expenditure  -1,579.34 -2,085.11 -1,384.10  -41.383  -450.708 -185.004 
  [180.181]*** [324.381]*** [350.499]***  [353.396]  [780.787] [704.177] 
Real Per Capita Non-Food Expenditure  -423.066 -593.677 -225.916 -222.903  -571.917 -156.397 
  [114.944]*** [170.594]***  [198.573]  [249.723]  [532.377] [488.787] 
Real Per Capita Utilities Expenditure  -423.769 -485.878  -598.42  185.811  274.460 9.760 
  [87.103]*** [119.117]***  [153.344]***  [108.653]*  [202.252] [146.641] 
Real Per Capita Education Expenditure  -119.253 -134.284  -85.663  -17.073  -179.356 -85.592 
  [28.321]*** [54.492]**  [35.377]**  [60.245]  [137.400] [77.230] 
Real Per Capita Durables Expenditure  -43.724 -101.807 -37.291  -47.355  -42.102 -14.741 
  [16.634]*** [54.980]*  [21.196]*  [23.569]**  [32.304] [26.795] 
Real Per Capita Expenditure Net of NE  -26.795 -32.989 -29.687  -5.642  3.697 -6.275 
  [14.149]* [11.146]***  [9.921]***  [11.163]  [16.110] [14.277] 
Satisfied with Current Financial Situation ∆  -0.078 -0.081 -0.081 -0.033  -0.016 -0.039 
  [0.015]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]***  [0.033]  [0.055] [0.038] 
Financial Situation Improved Past 3 Years ∆  -0.084 -0.042 -0.077 -0.042  -0.026 -0.127 
  [0.019]*** [0.027]  [0.035]**  [0.036]  [0.068] [0.074]* 
Financial Situation Improve Next 12 Months ∆  -0.069 -0.056 -0.055 0.001  0.032 0.023 
  [0.023]*** [0.038]  [0.038]  [0.045]  [0.065] [0.043] 
Food Consumption Adequate ∆  -0.165 -0.121 -0.174 0.022  -0.053 -0.060 
  [0.024]*** [0.038]*** [0.049]***  [0.051]  [0.062] [0.064] 
Overall Consumption Adequate ∆  -0.157 -0.129 -0.162 -0.005  -0.082 -0.072 
  [0.027]*** [0.038]*** [0.044]***  [0.042]  [0.060] [0.063] 
Satisfied with Life ∆  -0.078 -0.054 -0.092 0.018  0.040 0.003 
  [0.012]*** [0.025]** [0.028]***  [0.029]  [0.060] [0.029] 
Life Improved Past 3 Years ∆  -0.104 -0.079 -0.095 -0.015  -0.039 -0.070 
  [0.025]*** [0.029]*** [0.028]***  [0.038]  [0.049] [0.056] 
Life Improve Next 12 Months∆  -0.007 0.03 0.031  -0.024  -0.043 -0.080 
  [0.024] [0.037] [0.035] [0.042]  [0.074] [0.055] 
Note: Results with the Nearest 5-Neighbors estimator and a caliper of 0.001. */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level, respectively. ∆ denotes a dummy variable. 




Table 10: Impact of HH Social Protection on Individual Labor Supply  
Dependent Variable: Hours Worked in the Past 7 Days (Fixed Effects Models) 
Entire Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0667  -0.079*  -0.0163  -0.014  -0.0783  -0.106** 
  [0.0331]**  (0.042)  [0.1029]  (0.087)  [0.0335]**  (0.050) 
Old Age Pension  -0.006  -0.019  0.0027  0.006  -0.0097  -0.036 
  [0.0071]  (0.023)  [0.0126]  (0.029)  [0.0087]  (0.033) 
Observations  6713 1661 5052 
Number of Groups  2239 554 1685 
Test for Autocorrelation (P-Value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.59 0.53 0.61 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.12 -0.24 -0.25 
Rural Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   0.1077  0.097  0.2274  0.153  0.0691  0.069 
  [0.0743]  (0.061)  [0.1971]  (0.114)  [0.0786]  (0.074) 
Old Age Pension  -0.004  -0.010  -0.0278  -0.051  0.008  0.022 
  [0.0118]  (0.029)  [0.0219]  (0.042)  [0.0140]  (0.038) 
Observations  3642 912 2730 
Number of Groups  1214 304  910 
Test for Autocorrelation (P-Value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.58 0.58  0.6 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.44 -0.5 -0.54 
Urban Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.1118  -0.162***  -0.093  -0.094  -0.1157  -0.201*** 
  [0.0358]***  (0.059)  [0.1221]  (0.134)  [0.0349]***  (0.071) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0062  -0.025  0.0185  0.051  -0.0235  -0.111** 
  [0.0087]  (0.035)  [0.0154]  (0.042)  [0.0108]**  (0.055) 
Observations  3063 747 2316 
Number of Groups  1021 249  772 
Test for Autocorrelation (P-Value)  0.000 0.001 0.089 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.65 0.67 0.68 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.18 -0.64 -0.19 
 
Notes for Tables 13 and 14: Fixed-effects are estimated at the individual-level. */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 
percent level, respectively. The standard errors are in brackets. The elasticities are calculated at the mean value of NE and old-
age pension receipts computed among the NE and old-age pension recipient households, respectively. The following variables are 
included in the regressions but their coefficient estimates are not reported: (i) household receipts from work-invalidity pension 
(100s); (ii) household receipts from all other social protection programs (100s); (iii) a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual 
is married; (iv) a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual’s household is female-headed; (v) years of education of head of 
household; (vi) the number of household members in the following age categories: [0,5], [6,14], [15,55]; (vii) the number of 
household members that are domestic or international labor migrants; (viii) land area (in square meters) owned by a household; 
(ix) a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household is located in a rural area, and (x) year fixed effects for 2003 and 2004, where the 











Table 11: Impact of HH Social Protection on Individual Labor Supply  
Dependent Variable: Weeks Worked in the Past 12 Months (Fixed Effects Models) 
Entire Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0916  -0.111***  -0.0771  -0.077  -0.0963  -0.126*** 
  [0.0300]***  (0.040)  [0.0865]  (0.093)  [0.0315]***  (0.046) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0078  -0.026  -0.0002  -0.001  -0.0115  -0.041 
  [0.0064]  (0.022)  [0.0106]  (0.029)  [0.0082]  (0.030) 
Observations  6713 1661 5052 
Number of Groups  2239 554 1685 
Test for Autocorrelation (P-Value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.64 0.58 0.66 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.21 -0.2 -0.29 
Rural Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   0.0231  0.022  0.1094  0.085  -0.0065  -0.007 
  [0.0689]  (0.064)  [0.1702]  (0.122)  [0.0752]  (0.078) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0038  -0.010  -0.0027  -0.006  -0.0048  -0.013 
  [0.0109]  (0.028)  [0.0189]  (0.040)  [0.0134]  (0.038) 
Observations  3642 912 2730 
Number of Groups  1214 304  910 
Test for Autocorrelation (P-Value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.61 0.59 0.62 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.46 -0.4  -0.5 
Urban Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.1196  -0.182***  -0.1321  -0.164  -0.1167  -0.196*** 
  [0.0314]***  (0.055)  [0.1002]  (0.142)  [0.0319]***  (0.063) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0101  -0.042  0.0018  0.006  -0.0182  -0.083* 
  [0.0076]  (0.032)  [0.0127]  (0.043)  [0.0099]*  (0.048) 
Observations  3063 747 2316 
Number of Groups  1021 249  772 
Test for Autocorrelation (P-Value)  0.000 0.000 0.001 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.7 0.67  0.72 




Table 12: Impact of HH Social Protection on Individual Labor Supply (First Differencing Models) 
Entire Sample  Hours Worked in the Past 7 Days  Weeks Worked in the Past 12 Months 
Household Social Protection (100s)  All  Male  Female  All  Male  Female 
Ndihma  Ekonomike    -0.0885 -0.0693 -0.0924 -0.1049 -0.1193 -0.1039 
  [0.0299]*** [0.1025] [0.0300]***  [0.0268]*** [0.0856] [0.0279]*** 
Old  Age  Pension  -0.0026 0.0038 -0.0063 -0.0048 0.0006 -0.0079 
  [0.0070] [0.0124] [0.0088] [0.0063] [0.0103] [0.0081] 
Observations  4474 1107 3367 4474 1107 3367 
Number of Groups  2239 554 1685  2239 554 1685 
R-squared Overall  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Rural Sample  Hours Worked in the Past 7 Days  Weeks Worked in the Past 12 Months 
Household Social Protection (100s)  All  Male  Female  All  Male  Female 
Ndihma  Ekonomike    0.0096 -0.0596 0.0215 -0.0615 -0.1099 -0.0554 
  [0.0756] [0.2012] [0.0802] [0.0695] [0.1723] [0.0761] 
Old  Age  Pension  -0.012  -0.051  0.0087 -0.0097 -0.0184 -0.0049 
  [0.0128]  [0.0238]**  [0.0153] [0.0118] [0.0203] [0.0145] 
Observations  2428 608 1820  2428 608 1820 
Number of Groups  1214 304  910 1214 304  910 
R-squared Overall  0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
Urban Sample  Hours Worked in the Past 7 Days  Weeks Worked in the Past 12 Months 
Household Social Protection (100s)  All  Male  Female  All  Male  Female 
Ndihma  Ekonomike    -0.1048 -0.0628 -0.1096 -0.1112 -0.1167 -0.1097 
  [0.0315]*** [0.1207] [0.0306]***  [0.0274]*** [0.0982] [0.0275]*** 
Old Age Pension  0.0029  0.0238  -0.0144  -0.0017  0.008  -0.0099 
  [0.0082] [0.0147] [0.0103] [0.0072] [0.0119] [0.0093] 
Observations  2042 498 1544  2042 498 1544 
Number of Groups  1021 249  772 1021 249  772 
R-squared Overall  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Note: */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level, respectively. The standard errors are in brackets. The following variables are 
included in the regressions but their coefficient estimates are not reported: (i) household receipts from work-invalidity pension (100s); (ii) household 
receipts from all other social protection programs (100s); (iii) a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is married; (iv) a dummy variable equal to 
1 if an individual’s household is female-headed; (v) years of education of head of household; (vi) the number of household members in the following 
age categories: [0,5], [6,14], [15,55]; (vii) the number of household members that are domestic or international labor migrants; (viii) land area (in 
square meters) owned by a household; (ix) a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household is located in a rural area, and (x) year fixed effects for 2003 





Table 13: Impact of HH Social Protection on Likelihood of Labor Force Participation 
 (Linear Probability, Fixed Effects Models) 
Entire Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s)  Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0021  -0.090***  -0.0016  -0.053  -0.0023  -0.104*** 
  [0.0007]***  (0.032)  [0.0018]  (0.065)  [0.0008]***  (0.038) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0004  -0.042**  -0.0003  -0.025  -0.0004  -0.052** 
  [0.0001]**  (0.018)  [0.0002]  (0.021)  [0.0002]**  (0.025) 
Observations  6713 1661 5052 
Number of Groups  2239 554 1685 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.57 0.43  0.6 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.19 -0.05  -0.3 
Rural Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s)  Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0013  -0.048  -0.0025  -0.088  -0.0013  -0.049 
  [0.0015]  (0.058)  [0.0033]  (0.123)  [0.0017]  (0.068) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0003  -0.029  -0.0009  -0.084  0.0000  -0.002 
  [0.0002]  (0.025)  [0.0004]**  (0.037)  [0.0003]  (0.032) 
Observations  3642 912 2730 
Number of Groups  1214 304  910 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.57 0.46  0.6 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.46 -0.24 -0.54 
Urban Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s)  Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0023  -0.112***  -0.0016  -0.055  -0.0025  -0.140*** 
  [0.0008]***  (0.042)  [0.0024]  (0.088)  [0.0008]***  (0.052) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0004  -0.055**  0.0001  0.005  -0.0007  -0.116*** 
  [0.0002]**  (0.026)  [0.0003]  (0.029)  [0.0003]***  (0.042) 
Observations  3063 747 2316 
Number of Groups  1021 249  772 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.61 0.53 0.64 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.16 -0.52 -0.24 
Notes for Tables 13-16: Fixed effects are estimated at the individual-level. */**/*** indicates significance at the 10/5/1 percent level, respectively. 
The standard errors are in brackets. The elasticities are calculated at the mean value of NE and old-age pension receipts computed among the NE and 
old-age pension recipient households, respectively. The following variables are included in the regressions but their coefficient estimates are not 
reported: (i) household receipts from work-invalidity pension (100s); (ii) household receipts from all other social protection programs (100s); (iii) a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is married; (iv) a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual’s household is female-headed; (v) years of 
education of head of household; (vi) the number of household members in the following age categories: [0,5], [6,14], [15,55]; (vii) the number of 
household members that are domestic or international labor migrants; (viii) land area (in square meters) owned by a household; (ix) a dummy 





Table 14: Impact of HH Social Protection on Likelihood of Working for a Non-HH Member 
 (Linear Probability, Fixed Effects Models) 
Entire Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0023  -0.394***  -0.0028  -0.321  -0.0023  -0.490*** 
  [0.0005]***  (0.114)  [0.0018]  (0.267)  [0.0004]***  (0.140) 
Old Age Pension  0.0001  0.050  0.0002  0.076  0.0000  0.014 
  [0.0001]  (0.048)  [0.0002]  (0.068)  [0.0001]  (0.068) 
Observations  6713 1661 5052 
Number of Groups  2239 554 1685 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.61 0.52 0.64 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.15 -0.08 -0.27 
Rural Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0005  -0.146  -0.0019  -0.284  -0.0004  -0.276 
  [0.0008]  (0.280)  [0.0033]  (0.609)  [0.0006]  (0.441) 
Old Age Pension  0.0002  0.171*  0.0002  0.093  0.0002  0.293* 
  [0.0001]  (0.101)  [0.0004]  (0.144)  [0.0001]*  (0.161) 
Observations  3642 912 2730 
Number of Groups  1214 304  910 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.59 0.5 0.62 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.5 -0.3  -0.56 
Urban Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household  Social  Protection  (100s) Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0027  -0.253***  -0.0032  -0.264  -0.0027  -0.271*** 
  [0.0007]***  (0.078)  [0.0024]  (0.241)  [0.0007]***  (0.084) 
Old Age Pension  0.0000  0.010  0.0003  0.067  -0.0001  -0.032 
  [0.0002]  (0.042)  [0.0003]  (0.068)  [0.0002]  (0.058) 
Observations  3063 747 2316 
Number of Groups  1021 249  772 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.67 0.58 0.71 







Table 15: Impact of HH Social Protection on Likelihood of Working on HH Farm 
 (Linear Probability, Fixed Effects Models) 
Entire Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household Social Protection (100s)  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0002  -0.017  -0.0004  -0.038  -0.0002  -0.011 
  [0.0006]  (0.048)  [0.0016]  (0.154)  [0.0006]  (0.048) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0002  -0.044  -0.0004  -0.111**  0.0000  -0.005 
  [0.0001]  (0.028)  [0.0002]**  (0.054)  [0.0002]  (0.034) 
Observations  6713 1661 5052 
Number of Groups  2239 554 1685 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.67 0.65 0.68 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.06 0.05 -0.09 
Rural Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household Social Protection (100s)  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   -0.0007  -0.031  -0.0013  -0.074  -0.0006  -0.024 
  [0.0017]  (0.079)  [0.0040]  (0.252)  [0.0018]  (0.080) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0005  -0.058*  -0.0013  -0.204**  0.0000  -0.005 
  [0.0003]*  (0.035)  [0.0004]***  (0.092)  [0.0003]  (0.038) 
Observations  3642 912 2730 
Number of Groups  1214 304  910 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.6 0.58 0.6 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.45 -0.31  -0.5 
Urban Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household Social Protection (100s)  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   0.0000  -0.032  0.0000  0.015  0.0000  -0.041 
  [0.0003]  (0.289)  [0.0007]  (0.879)  [0.0003]  (0.299) 
Old Age Pension  0.0000  -0.081  0.0000  -0.097  0.0000  -0.071 
  [0.0001]  (0.195)  [0.0001]  (0.322)  [0.0001]  (0.255) 
Observations  3063 747 2316 
Number of Groups  1021 249  772 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.57 0.48  0.6 








Table 16: Impact of HH Social Protection on Likelihood of Working on Own Account 
 (Linear Probability, Fixed Effects Models) 
Entire Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household Social Protection (100s)  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   0.0003  0.095  0.0018  0.271*  0.0001  0.027 
  [0.0004]  (0.115)  [0.0014]  (0.153)  [0.0004]  (0.184) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0001  -0.104  0.0001  0.037  -0.0003  -0.344** 
  [0.0001]  (0.079)  [0.0002]  (0.066)  [0.0001]**  (0.175) 
Observations  6713 1661  5052 
Number of Groups  2239 554  1685 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.59 0.58  0.59 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.19 -0.18  -0.19 
Rural Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household Social Protection (100s)  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   0.0002  0.091  0.0032  0.503**  -0.0004  -0.312 
  [0.0008]  (0.332)  [0.0024]  (0.205)  [0.0008]  (0.889) 
Old Age Pension  0  -0.036  0.0001  0.054  -0.0001  -0.243 
  [0.0001]  (0.161)  [0.0003]  (0.111)  [0.0001]  (0.426) 
Observations  3642 912  2730 
Number of Groups  1214 304  910 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.51 0.55  0.49 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.16 -0.33  -0.17 
Urban Sample  All   Male   Female 
Household Social Protection (100s)  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity  Coefficient  Elasticity 
Ndihma Ekonomike   0.0003  0.074  0.0011  0.130  0.0002  0.078 
  [0.0005]  (0.105)  [0.0018]  (0.192)  [0.0004]  (0.142) 
Old Age Pension  -0.0002  -0.108  0.0001  0.022  -0.0003  -0.328** 
  [0.0001]  (0.079)  [0.0002]  (0.074)  [0.0001]**  (0.160) 
Observations  3063 747  2316 
Number of Groups  1021 249  772 
Fraction of Variance due to Ui  0.64 0.76  0.66 
Correlation [Ui,Xb]  -0.19 -0.71  -0.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 